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Abstract
We study social choice rules under the utilitarian distortion frame-
work, with an additional metric assumption on the agents’ costs over
the alternatives. In this approach, these costs are given by an underly-
ing metric on the set of all agents plus alternatives. Social choice rules
have access to only the ordinal preferences of agents but not the latent
cardinal costs that induce them. Distortion is then defined as the ratio
between the social cost (typically the sum of agent costs) of the alterna-
tive chosen by the mechanism at hand, and that of the optimal alternative
chosen by an omniscient algorithm. The worst-case distortion of a social
choice rule is, therefore, a measure of how close it always gets to the op-
timal alternative without any knowledge of the underlying costs. Under
this model, it has been conjectured that Ranked Pairs, the well-known
weighted-tournament rule, achieves a distortion of at most 3 [Anshele-
vich et al., 2015]. We disprove this conjecture by constructing a sequence
of instances which shows that the worst-case distortion of Ranked Pairs
is at least 5. Our lower bound on the worst case distortion of Ranked
Pairs matches a previously known upper bound for the Copeland rule,
proving that in the worst case, the simpler Copeland rule is at least as
good as Ranked Pairs. And as long as we are limited to (weighted or un-
weighted) tournament rules, we demonstrate that randomization cannot
help achieve an expected worst-case distortion of less than 3. Using the
concept of approximate majorization within the distortion framework, we
prove that Copeland and Randomized Dictatorship achieve low constant
factor fairness-ratios (5 and 3 respectively), which is a considerable gen-
eralization of similar results for the sum of costs and single largest cost
objectives. In addition to all of the above, we outline several interesting
directions for further research in this space.
∗Management Science and Engineering, Stanford University
†Electrical Engineering, Stanford University
‡Computer Science, Duke University
1
ar
X
iv
:1
61
2.
02
91
2v
2 
 [c
s.G
T]
  8
 M
ay
 20
17
1 Introduction
Social choice theory is the science of aggregating the varied preferences of mul-
tiple agents into a single collective decision. Ways of doing this aggregation are
called social choice rules – functions that map the given preferences of agents,
typically in the form of total orderings over a set of alternatives, to a single
alternative. The conventional approach to reasoning about the quality of out-
comes obtained from these rules has been a normative, axiomatic one. A variety
of axiomatic criteria, corresponding to naturally desirable properties, have been
proposed, and a great deal of work has been done to understand which axioms
can or cannot be satisfied together, and how the known social choice rules mea-
sure up against them. For instance, a few celebrated results [Gibbard, 1973,
Satterthwaite, 1975] rule out the concurrent satisfiability of such basic axioms,
and additional spatial assumptions that help sidestep these impossibilities have
been identified [Moulin, 1980, Barbera, 2001].
Another approach, which has received a great deal of attention lately [Pro-
caccia and Rosenschein, 2006, Caragiannis and Procaccia, 2011, Boutilier et al.,
2015], is to assume a utilitarian view, as is commonplace in economics and al-
gorithmic mechanism design. Every agent has latent cardinal preferences over
the alternatives in terms of utility (or cost) and the social utility of an alterna-
tive is a function of the agents’ utilities. The most commonly used objective is
the total sum of agent utilities for an alternative. Social choice rules are then
viewed as approximation algorithms which try to choose the best alternative
given access only to ordinal preferences. Similar to the competitive ratio of
online approximation algorithms, the quantity of interest here is the worst-case
value (over all possible underlying utilities) of the distortion – the ratio of the
social utility of the truly optimal alternative over that of the alternative chosen
by the social choice rule at hand [Procaccia and Rosenschein, 2006].
Characterizing the worst-case distortion of social choice functions has re-
cently emerged as the central question within the utilitarian approach to social
choice. Without any assumptions on the utilities, the distortion of deterministic
social choice rules is unbounded [Procaccia and Rosenschein, 2006], and that of
randomized social choice rules is Ω(m), where m is the number of alternatives
[Boutilier et al., 2015].
Interestingly, some constant factor bounds on the distortion of social choice
rules are made possible with an additional metric assumption on the cardinal
preferences of agents, represented by their costs with respect to alternatives
[Anshelevich et al., 2015]. These costs are assumed to form an unknown, arbi-
trary metric space, and distortion is redefined in terms of these costs. In this
setting, the best known positive result for deterministic social rules is that the
distortion of the Copeland rule, a tournament function, is at most 5 [Anshele-
vich et al., 2015]. It is known that the worst-case distortion of any deterministic
social choice rule is at least 3, and that Ranked Pairs, a weighted-tournament
function, achieves this lower bound given some assumptions on the ordinal pref-
erences of agents. It is also known that the distortion of any randomized rule
is at least 2, and that of Randomized Dictatorship is at most 3 [Anshelevich
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and Postl, 2016], showing that randomization helps beat the performance of
common deterministic rules with respect to worst-case distortion.
An important open question here is whether the worst-case distortion of
Ranked Pairs is indeed 3, as has been conjectured [Anshelevich et al., 2015].
And given that tournament (or weighted-tournament rules) provide the best
known bounds in the deterministic case, another interesting question is whether
they perform well in the randomized case too, and in particular, better than
Randomized Dictatorship. The first half of this paper is devoted to settling these
questions, providing answers in the negative for both. The proof for Ranked
Pairs is particularly surprising and intricate.
Under the utilitarian metric distortion approach, in addition to reasoning
about the total social cost, it is natural to ask how “fair” choosing a particular
alternative is in terms of the cost incurred by the agents. For example, let us say
there are two agents and two alternatives, and the costs incurred by the agents
are x1, x2 for the first alternative, and (x1 + x2)/2, (x1 + x2)/2 for the second.
It seems natural that the second is more “fair” than the first. Various notions
of fairness such as lexicographic fairness1, prefix-based measures, and the more
general approximate majorization measure, have been studied in the context
of routing, bandwidth allocation and load balancing problems [Kleinberg et al.,
1999, Kumar and Kleinberg, 2000, Goel et al., 2001]. Other measures of fairness
such as envy-freeness [Chen et al., 2013, Caragiannis et al., 2009], maximin-
shares [Procaccia and Wang, 2014], and leximin [Barbara` and Jackson, 1988,
Rawls, 2009] have also been studied in the context of mechanism design and
social choice. We could also look at objectives given by α-percentiles (α = 0.5
is the median) for α ∈ [0, 1]. While there are positive results (as achieved by
Copeland) for α ∈ [0.5, 1), it is known that for α ∈ [0, 0.5), all deterministic
social choice rules have unbounded worst-case distortion [Anshelevich et al.,
2015].
A question arises as to which of the above notions of fairness can be adapted
to the metric distortion framework, and moreover yields meaningful results.
Even if percentiles were the the most appropriate, they are too strong for this
domain given the lower bounds [Anshelevich et al., 2015] mentioned above; in
fact, there are very few resource allocation settings known where simultaneous
maximization or approximation of all percentiles is possible. Notions from cake-
cutting such as envy-freeness and maximin shares do not apply to social choice
settings, since these definitions assume a partition of available goods among
agents; in social choice settings, we make a single societal decision rather than
partition resources. We will instead look at approximate majorization, which
attempts to minimize, simultaneously for all k, the sum of the k-largest costs
incurred by agents. This generalizes both lexicographic fairness and total cost
minimization, and applies to any setting where agents receive utilities (or costs),
regardless of whether the underlying problem is one of cake-cutting, resource
allocation, or social choice. Further, an approximate majorization ratio of α
guarantees an α-approximation of a large class of fairness measures, including
1This is also called max-min fairness in the resource allocation literature.
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v1 c2c1
v2’s cost for c1 = 3
= the length of the shortest path.
Figure 1: Underlying shortest path metric in Example 1 – each edge is of unit
weight
all p-moments of costs for agents, for p ≥ 1. The second half of this paper
states and proves these fairness results. In particular, we show how the simple
Copeland rule approximates a broad class of convex cost functions.
Warm-up example of metric costs and distortion Imagine there are
three alternatives c1, c2, c3, and three agents v1, v2, v3 with preferences c1 
c2  c3, c2  c3  c1 and c3  c1  c2 respectively. The underlying costs are
given by the shortest path metric on the graph in Figure 1. The agent costs are
given by d(., .) as follows:
(i) d(v1, c1) = d(v1, c2) = d(v1, c3) = 1;
(ii) d(v2, c2) = d(v2, c3) = 1, d(v2, c1) = 3;
(iii) d(v3, c3) = 0, d(v3, c1) = d(v3, c2) = 2.
Let’s say that a deterministic rule chooses c1 as the winner based on the pref-
erences. Then the distortion is given by
∑
i=1,2,3 d(vi, c1)/
∑
i=1,2,3 d(vi, c3) =
6/2 = 3. In fact, this metric achieves the worst-case distortion among all possi-
ble metrics that agree with the given preferences.
If a randomized rule picks each of the three alternatives with equal proba-
bility, the expected distortion will be equal to ( 13 .6 +
1
3 .4 +
1
3 .2)/2 = 2. It can
be seen, based on symmetry, that this distribution minimizes the worst-case
distortion over all possible metrics that agree with the preferences.
Let us also look at the fairness ratio when we pick c1 as the winner. The
largest cost for c1 is that of v2 with d(v2, c1) = 3. And for the optimal al-
ternative c3, the largest cost is d(v1, c3) = 1. The ratio of these values is
3. Similarly if we look at the ratio of the two largest costs, then we have
[d(v2, c1) +d(v3, c1)]/[d(v1, c3) +d(v2, c3)] = 5/2. For the three largest costs, we
have a ratio of 3 from above. Therefore, the alternative c1 achieves a fairness
ratio of max{3, 2.5, 3} = 3.
1.1 Our contributions
Our first set of results are in the negative: we show that social choice rules of
simple forms cannot have worst-case distortion ratios matching the known lower
bounds. Our second set of results concern defining fairness in this setting, and
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upper bounding the fairness ratios of natural social choice rules, in particular
the Copeland rule.
Lower Bounds on Distortion It has been conjectured that the simple
Ranked Pairs rule achieves the optimal distortion ratio of 3 [Anshelevich et al.,
2015]. This conjecture is based on the fact that if the ordinal preferences of
agents are restricted to be of a certain form, Ranked Pairs does indeed have a
distortion at most 3 (see Theorem 2). Our first main result is disproving this
conjecture – we show that Ranked Pairs, and the related Schulze rule, have a
worst-case distortion ratio at least 5, and in that sense are no better than the
Copeland rule when the preferences are general. We do this by constructing
a sequence of instances where the agent preferences are obtained by coupling
cyclic permutations of two equally large sets of alternatives in a one to one
fashion.
Result 1 (Theorem 3). Ranked Pairs, and the Schulze rule, have a worst-case
distortion ratio of at least 5.
As stated before, a lower bound of 2 is known on the worst-case distortion
of any randomized rule [Anshelevich and Postl, 2016]. We show that this lower
bound cannot be achieved by any rule that looks at only the pairwise wins/losses
among the alternatives, or the margins of these wins/losses (tournament rules
and weighted-tournament rules – see Section 2.2 for a definition).
Result 2 (Theorem 4). The worst-case (expected) distortion of any tournament
or weighted-tournament rule is at least 3.
Fairness properties We introduce a method of quantifying the “fairness” of
social choice rules by incorporating the concept of approximate majorization
[Goel and Meyerson, 2006] within the metric distortion framework. For this
purpose, we redefine the social cost of any alternative as the sum of its k largest
agent costs. How fair a given social choice rule is depends on how the alternative
it chooses performs on this objective compared to every other alternative. To
evaluate the fairness of a social choice rule, we then seek to bound the distortion
ratio of this objective simultaneously over all possible values of k: we call this
the fairness ratio (we define this measure formally in the next section).
The fairness ratio generalizes both the sum of costs objective (utilitarian-
ism), and maxmin fairness (egalitarianism). Given such a strong definition, it
is impossible to achieve a constant fairness ratio in many settings, and surpris-
ingly, for the metric distortion problem we study in this paper, simple social
choice rules like Copeland and Randomized Dictatorship achieve small constant
fairness ratios that match the best known distortion bounds for just the sum
objective.
Result 3 (Theorem 5). Copeland rule achieves a fairness ratio of at most 5.
Result 4 (Theorem 6). Randomized Dictatorship achieves a fairness ratio of
at most 3.
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Additionally, for deterministic rules, a bound on the fairness ratio translates
to an approximation result for a general class of symmetric convex objectives
(see Section 2.5). And therefore, the above result leads us to the surprising ob-
servation that, assuming metric costs, the simple Copeland rule simultaneously
approximates a very broad class of cost functions.
Conjectures and open problems There are many directions for further re-
search on the metric distortion problem. We mention some of these in context
as we go along (Conjectures 1, 2). More details can be found in the Appendix
in Sections 6.1 and 6.2. For example, for randomized rules, we suggest an inter-
esting variation of the measure of distortion, one that is stronger adversarially
than the standard measure (Section 6.2).
1.2 Related Literature
Several interesting problems pertaining to the distortion arising from the map-
ping of cardinal preferences to ordinal information have been studied [Moulin
et al., 2016]. The worst case distortion of social choice rules, with unrestricted
or normalized utilities, is known to be unbounded [Procaccia and Rosenschein,
2006]. With randomized mechanisms, it is possible to achieve a distortion of
Ω(
√
m log∗m), where m is the number of alternatives [Caragiannis and Pro-
caccia, 2011]. The standard assumption here is that agents translate cardinal
scores into ordinal preferences in the straightforward way – the alternative with
the k-th highest utility is placed in the k-th position. If this mapping could be
done in any other way, it is possible to construct low distortion embeddings of
cardinal preferences into (ordinal) social choice rules like plurality [Caragian-
nis and Procaccia, 2011]. Another interesting result here is that is possible to
construct a truthful-in-expectation mechanism whose worst-case distortion is
O(m3/4) [Filos-Ratsikas and Miltersen, 2014].
Analysis of cardinal preferences under spatial models of proximity has had
a long history in social choice [Enelow and Hinich, 1984, Moulin, 1980]. Such
models, especially those with euclidean spaces, have also been commonly studied
in the approximation algorithms literature on facility location problems [Arya
et al., 2004, Drezner and Hamacher, 1995]. In these models, the cost of an
agent for an alternative is given by the distance between the two. As mentioned
earlier, our work follows the literature on the analysis of distortion of social
choice rules under the assumption that agent costs form an unknown metric
space [Anshelevich et al., 2015, Anshelevich and Postl, 2016]. We have already
mentioned that several lower and upper bounds for both the sum of costs and
percentile objectives are known in this setting. In addition, it is known that a
distortion of at most 4 for the median objective can be achieved by a randomized
mechanism that chooses from the uncovered set [Anshelevich and Postl, 2016].
It is important to note that in the special case of euclidean metrics, it possi-
ble to design low distortion mechanisms, with the additional constraint of their
being truthful-in-expectation [Feldman et al., 2016]. Additionally, the metric
distortion framework has also been used to study other problems such as finding
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an approximate maximum weight matching with access to only ordinal prefer-
ences [Anshelevich and Sekar, 2016].
In the distortion framework, both the interpersonal comparison of utilities,
and the goal of utility maximization, are implicitly assumed to be valid. While
the interpersonal comparison of utilities is more meaningful in some contexts
than others [Boutilier et al., 2015], we take it for granted.
While the results on the distortion of the sum of costs (or utilities) objective
are extremely interesting, minimization of total cost (or maximization of total
utility) is not the only imaginable goal of social choice mechanisms. The first
step toward other understanding the distortion of other objectives is apparent
in the various results on the distortion of the median cost objective [Anshelevich
et al., 2015, Anshelevich and Postl, 2016]. We take a further step in this direction
by drawing on the notions of fairness that have been studied in the context of of
network problems such as bandwidth allocation and load balancing [Kleinberg
et al., 1999, Kumar and Kleinberg, 2000, Goel et al., 2001].
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Social Choice Rules
Let V be the set of agents and C the set of alternatives. We will use N to denote
the total number of agents, i.e., N = |V|. Every agent v ∈ V has a strict (no
ties) preference ordering σv on C. For any c, c′ ∈ C, we will use c v c′ to denote
the fact that agent v ∈ V prefers c over c′ in her ordering σv. Let S be the set of
all possible preference orderings on V. We call a profile of preference orderings
σ ∈ SN as an instance.
Based on the preferences of agents, we want to determine a single alternative
as the winner, or a distribution over the alternatives and pick a winner according
to it. A deterministic social choice rule is a function f : SN → C that maps
each instance to an alternative. A randomized social choice rule is a function
g : SN → ∆(C), where ∆(C) is the space of all probability distributions over the
set of alternatives C.
To define the social choice rules that we use in this paper, we need a few
additional definitions. An alternative c pairwise-beats c′ if |{v ∈ V : c v c′}| ≥
N
2 , with ties broken arbitrarily. Given an instance σ, a complete weighted
digraph Gt(σ) with C as the set of nodes, and the weight of any edge c → c′
given by w(c, c′) = |{v ∈ V : c v c′}|, is called the weighted-tournament graph
induced by σ. An unweighted digraph Gm(σ) with C as the set of nodes such
that an edge from c → c′ exists iff c pairwise beats c′ is called the tournament
graph induced by σ.
• Ranked Pairs: Given an instance σ, sort the edges of the weighted-
tournament graph Gt(σ) according to the values w(., .) in some non-
decreasing order (breaking ties arbitrarily). Start with a graph G = (C, ∅)
and iterate over the edges in the order determined above. At each step,
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add the edge to G if it does not create a cycle, and discard the edge other-
wise. The winning alternative is the source node of the resulting directed
acyclic graph.
• Copeland: Given an instance σ, define a score for each c ∈ C given by
|{c′ ∈ C : c pairwise beats c′}|. The alternative with the highest score
(the largest number of pairwise victories) is chosen to be the winner. In
other words, the winning alternative is the node in the tournament graph
Gm(σ) with the maximum out-degree (breaking ties arbitrarily).
• Randomized Dictatorship: Choose alternative c ∈ C with probability
p(c) equal to |Vc|/N where Vc = {v ∈ V : c v c′, ∀c′ 6= c}.
• Schulze [Schulze, 2003] In the weighted-tournament graph, a path of
strength p from alternative c to alternative c′ is a sequence of candi-
dates c1, c2, . . . , cn with the following properties: (i) c1 = c and cn = c
′,
(ii) for all i = 1, . . . , (n − 1), w(ci, ci+1) ≥ w(ci+1, ci), and (iii) for all
i = 1, . . . , (n− 1), w(ci, ci+1) ≥ p.
Let p(c, c′) be the strength of the strongest path from c to c′. If there is
no path from c to c′, then p(c, c′) = 0.
Define a relation ? as follows: ∀c, c′, c ? c′ ⇐⇒ p(c, c′) > p(c′, c).
It can be proven that ? defines a transitive relation. The alternative
(with arbitrary tie-breaking, as there may be many such) c?, such that
p(c?, c) ≥ p(c, c?) for all other alternatives c, is chosen as the winner.
2.2 Tournament and weighted-tournament rules
Any social choice rule that chooses an alternative, or a distribution over the
alternatives, based on just the tournament graph is called a tournament rule
[Moulin et al., 2016]. These are also called C1 functions according to Fishburn’s
classification [Fishburn, 1977]. Any rule that is a function of the weighted-
tournament graph is a weighted-tournament rule, as long as it is not a tour-
nament rule [Moulin et al., 2016]. According to Fishburn’s classification, these
rules are also called C2 functions [Fishburn, 1977]. Such rules do not need
knowledge of all the preferences orderings, just the aggregated information in
terms of the tournament/weighted-tournament graph. From the above defini-
tions, we see that Ranked Pairs is a deterministic weighted-tournament rule,
and Copeland a tournament rule. Randomized Dictatorship is neither a tour-
nament rule nor a weighted-tournament rule, because it needs to know which
alternative is first in each ordering.
2.3 Metric costs
We assume that the agent costs over the alternatives is given by an underlying
metric d on C ∪ V. d(v, c) is the cost incurred by agent v when alternative c is
chosen as the winning alternative.
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Definition 1. A function d : C∪V×C∪V → R≥0 is a metric iff ∀x, y, z ∈ C∪V,
we have the following: 1. d(x, y) ≥ 0, 2. d(x, x) = 0, 3. d(x, y) = d(y, x) , and
4. d(x, z) ≤ d(x, y) + d(y, z).
We can do with a much simpler yet equivalent assumption on the agents’
costs (see Lemma 1). We need to first define a q-metric (“q” for quadrilateral)
by replacing the triangle inequalities by “quadrilateral” inequalities (Condition
2 in the definition below).
Definition 2. A function d : V × C → R≥0 is a q-metric iff ∀v, v′ ∈ V, and
∀c, c′ ∈ C, we have the following:
1. d(v, c) ≥ 0
2. d(v, c) ≤ d(v, c′) + d(v′, c′) + d(v′, c)
The following equivalence result could be of independent interest in problems
involving metrics. We make heavy use of it in later sections to prove our results.
Lemma 1. If d is a q-metric, then there exists a metric d′ such that d(v, c) =
d′(v, c) for all v ∈ V and c ∈ C.
Proof. For all v, v′ ∈ V and c, c′ ∈ C, we define
d′(v, c) = d′(c, v) = d(v, c), (1)
d′(c, c′) = max
v∈V
|d(v, c)− d(v, c′)|, (2)
d′(v, v′) = max
c∈C
|d(v, c)− d(v′, c)|. (3)
Clearly, by the above definitions, and that of a q-metric, for all x, y ∈ C ∪V, we
have d(x, y) ≥ 0, d(x, x) = 0 and d(x, y) = d(y, x).
Consider c1, c2, c3 ∈ C. Without loss of generality with respect to c1, c2, c3,
there exists u ∈ V such that
d′(c1, c3) = d(u, c1)− d(u, c3)
= d(u, c1)− d(u, c2) + d(u, c2)− d(u, c3)
≤ |d(u, c1)− d(u, c2)|+ |d(u, c2)− d(u, c3)|
≤ d′(c1, c2) + d′(c2, c3).
Consider v1, v2 ∈ V and c ∈ C. Again without loss of generality with respect
to v1, v2, there exists c
′ ∈ C such that
d′(v1, v2) = d(v1, c′)− d(v2, c′)
≤ d(v1, c) + d(v2, c)
= d′(v1, c) + d′(v2, c).
The inequality in the second line of the above follows by Condition 2 in Definition
2. Inequalities corresponding to Condition 4 in Definition 1 for triangles given
by v1, v2, v3 and v, c1, c2 for all v, v1, v2, v3 ∈ V and c1, c2 ∈ C follow analogously.
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Henceforth, we will deal mainly with q-metrics and use the terms metric
and q-metric interchangeably.
2.4 Distortion
We say that a metric d is consistent with an instance σ, if whenever any agent
v prefers c over c′, then the her cost for c must be at most her cost for c′, i.e.,
c v c′ =⇒ d(v, c) ≤ d(v, c′). We denote by ρ(σ) the set of all metrics d that
are consistent with σ.
The social cost of an alternative is taken as the sum of agent costs for
it. For any metric d, we define φ(c, d) =
∑
v∈V d(v, c). For any instance
σ, a consistent metric d, and any deterministic social choice rule f , define
Φ(f(σ), d) = φ(f(σ), d). If f is a randomized social choice rule, we define
Φ(f(σ), d) = E[φ(f(σ), d)].
As mentioned before, we want to measure how close a social choice rule gets
to the optimal alternative in terms of social cost. We view every social choice as
trying to approximate the optimal alternative, with knowledge of only the agent
preference instance σ, but not the underlying metric cost d that induces σ. To
measure this performance, we take the ratio of the social cost of the alternative
chosen by the rule for σ, and the optimal alternative according to d. Distortion
[Procaccia and Rosenschein, 2006] is then defined as the worst-case value of this
quantity over all metrics d that are consistent with σ:
dist(f, σ) = sup
d∈ρ(σ)
Φ(f(σ), d)
minc∈C φ(c, d)
In other words, the distortion of a rule f on an instance σ is the worst-case ratio
of the social cost Φ of f(σ), and that of the optimal alternative. By worst-case
we mean the largest value of the above over all possible metrics d that could
induce σ, since f does not know what the true underlying metric is. In fact,
we look to bound the quantity dist(f, σ) over all possible instances, so as to
have a measure of performance for the given rule f independent of the what the
instance is, i.e., the worst-case distortion of f .
2.5 Fairness
Given an underlying metric, based on the alternative chosen, the costs incurred
might vary widely among the agents. We want to formally quantify how “fair”
choosing a particular alternative is. For this purpose, we look at social cost
defined as the sum of k largest agent costs, for all 1 ≤ k ≤ N . For any metric
d and c ∈ C, we define ∀1 ≤ k ≤ N ,
φk(c, d) = max
S⊆V:|S|=k
∑
v∈V
d(v, c).
For a deterministic social choice rule f , we define Φk(f(σ), d) = φk(f(σ), d),
for all instances σ and consistent metrics d. If f is a randomized social choice
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rule, we define Φk(f(σ), d) = E[φk(f(σ), d)]2, for all instances σ and consistent
metrics d. We define the fairness-ratio of f as follows:
fairness(f, σ) = sup
d∈ρ(σ)
max
1≤k≤N
Φk(f(σ), d)
minc∈C Φk(c, d)
The fairness ratio of a rule f on an instance σ is a worst-case bound on how
well it simultaneously (for all k) approximates the social cost given by Φk of
f(σ), compared to the optimal alternative, over all possible metrics d that could
induce σ, without knowing what the true underlying metric is.
Bounds for general convex costs via the fairness ratio Another reason
for studying the fairness ratio is that for deterministic social choice rules, a
bound on the fairness-ratio translates to an approximation result with respect
to any canonical cost function – a symmetric convex function F of the vector
of agent costs such that F
(
~0
)
= 0 and F is non-decreasing in each argument
[Goel and Meyerson, 2006].
For any c ∈ C, define ~d(c) = [d(v1, c), . . . , d(vN , c)], where V = {v1, . . . , vN}.
Theorem 1. For any deterministic social choice rule f , instance σ, consistent
metric d, and canonical cost function F , if fairness(f, σ) ≤ α, then for any
c ∈ C,
F
(
~d(f(σ))
α
)
≤ F
(
~d(c)
)
.
Proof. For any vector ~x ∈ RN , let x(1) ≥ x(2) ≥ . . . x(i) ≥ . . . x(N) denote its
components arranged in some non-decreasing order. For any 1 ≤ k ≤ N , define
Sk(~x) =
∑k
i=1 x(i).
A vector ~x is said to be α-submajorized by ~y iff Sk(~x) ≤ αSk(~y), for all
1 ≤ k ≤ N .
If fairness(f, σ) ≤ α, then for any c ∈ C, we have that ~d(f(σ)) is α-
submajorized by ~d(c). This implies that F
(
~d(f(σ))
α
)
≤ F
(
~d(c)
)
(Theorem
2.3 in [Goel and Meyerson, 2006]).
If a deterministic social choice rule has a fairness ratio of at most α, then for
all p ≥ 1, the lp norm of the cost vector for the agents under this social choice rule
is at most α times the optimum, giving an “all-norms” approximation (Corollary
1). As special cases, this gives an α-approximation for many objective functions
such as the sum, the maximum, and the `2 norm of the agents costs for an
alternative, using p = 1, ∞, and 2 respectively.
Corollary 1. For any deterministic social choice rule f , instance σ, and p ≥ 1,
if fairness(f, σ) ≤ α, then for any c ∈ C,
||~d(f(σ))||p ≤ α||~d(c)||p.
2We could define variations of this objective, leading to interesting open questions (see
Section 6.2)
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3 Lower bounds on distortion
In this section, we will establish that Ranked Pairs fails to achieve a distortion
of at most 3, contrary to what has been conjectured [Anshelevich et al., 2015],
thereby falling short of the lower bound on the worst-case distortion of any
deterministic rule. We also show a similar result on how tournament/weighted-
tournament rules fail to come close to the lower bound of 2 on the worst-case
distortion of any randomized rule.
cn cn−1
c1
c2
c1 is a Ranked Pairs winner,
cn beats c1 often.
Figure 2: Weighted-tournament Graph: A cycle of heavy edges making c1 the
Ranked Pairs winner.
3.1 Ranked Pairs
In our first result, we will show that the worst-case distortion of Ranked Pairs is
at least 5. [Anshelevich et al., 2015] conjectured that the worst case bound here
is 3. This conjecture was based on the result that if the tournament graph does
not have cycles of length greater than 4, then the distortion of Ranked Pairs is,
in fact, bounded above by 3.
Theorem 2 ([Anshelevich et al., 2015]). The distortion of ranked pairs is at
most 3, as long as the tournament graph has circumference at most 4.
Assume for a moment that among the set of alternatives C, c is the Ranked
Pairs winner, and c′ is the optimal alternative that minimizes the sum of agent
costs. To achieve a large distortion, c′ must beat c often. And since c is the
Ranked Pairs winner, at the step when c′ → c is considered in the Ranked Pairs
iteration over edges, a path from c to c′ must already be in place.
One way of achieving this structure is to have n agents, each with a preference
ordering that is a different cyclic permutation of c1, c2, . . . , cn. c1 is then a
Ranked Pairs winner (assuming ties are broken in its favor), and the cycle
c1 → c2, c2 → c3, . . . , cn−1 → cn, cn → c1 has edges of (equal) weight larger
than those of edges not on the cycle (Figure 2). The worst case distortion in
this case, however, is only 3.
3.1.1 Coupling of two sets of cyclic permutations
To achieve a larger distortion, we engineer an overall cyclic structure similar to
Figure 2 on 2n+ 1 alternatives with n+ 2 agents as follows: construct n agents
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with distinct preference orderings by taking each cyclic permutation of c1, . . . , cn
and coupling it with a corresponding permutation of cn+2, . . . , c2n+1, pivoted
about cn+1. We add two agents with the preference exactly c1, c2, . . . , c2n+1.
To understand this coupling, let us look at a related example when n = 2.
Figure 3: Coupling example: n = 2
Example 1. We couple c4  c5 with c2  c1, and c5  c4 with c1  c2 using
c3 as a pivot to get two agents v1 and v2 as in Figure 3. To make c1 the unique
Ranked Pairs winner, we make n copies each of v1 and v2, and add n+ 1 copies
of a third agent v0 with preference c1  c2  c3  c4  c5. We will see in the
proof of Theorem 3 that the following is a valid metric:
c4 v1 c5︸ ︷︷ ︸
d(v1, .) = 1
v1 c2 v1 c3︸ ︷︷ ︸
d(v1, .) = 3
v1 c1︸︷︷︸
d(v1, .) = 5
c5︸︷︷︸
d(v2, .) = 0
v2 c3 v2 c4︸ ︷︷ ︸
d(v2, .) = 2
v2 c1 v2 c2︸ ︷︷ ︸
d(v2, .) = 4
c1 v0 c2 v0 c3 v0 c4 v0 c5︸ ︷︷ ︸
d(v0, .) = 2
The ratio of the total costs of c1 and c5 here is
5(n)+4(n)+2(n+1)
1(n)+0(n)+2(n+1) =
11n+2
3n+2 , which
is more than 3 for n ≥ 3. This serves as simple counter-example to the conjec-
ture that Ranked Pairs achieves a distortion of 3.
This example can be modified to give a sequence of instances that lead to a
distortion of 5 in the limit. In every instance in this sequence, we will see that
the Ranked Pairs winner does not depend on how ties are broken.
Theorem 3. There exists a sequence of instances {σ(n)}n≥2 such that
lim
n→∞dist(Ranked-Pairs, σ
(n)) = 5.
Proof. For each n ≥ 2, construct an instance σ(n) and a corresponding metric
d as follows: There are n + 2 agents given by V = {v0, v′0, v1, v2, . . . , vn}, and
2n+ 1 alternatives given by C = {c1, c2, . . . , c2n+1}.
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Both v0 and v
′
0 have the preference order c1  c2  . . .  c2n+1, and
d(v0, c) = d(v
′
0, c) = 2 for all c ∈ C.
For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, vi has the preference order
cn+i+1  ...  c2n+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
d(vi, .) = 1
 ci+1  ...  cn+i︸ ︷︷ ︸
d(vi, .) = 3
 c1  ...  ci︸ ︷︷ ︸
d(vi, .) = 5
.
Also, define d as follows, for all c ∈ C:
d(vi, cj) =

1, if n+ i+ 1 ≤ j ≤ 2n+ 1,
3, if i+ 1 ≤ j ≤ n+ i,
5, if 1 ≤ j ≤ i.
First we show that d thus constructed is a valid q-metric. For all (v, c) ∈
V × C, d(v, c) ≥ 0 is trivially satisfied. Let A = {c1, c2, . . . , cn} and B =
{cn+1, . . . , c2n+1}. For all a, a′ ∈ A, and b, b′ ∈ B, and v ∈ V,
|d(v, a)− d(v, b)| ≤ 4,
|d(v, a)− d(v, a′)| ≤ 2,
|d(v, b)− d(v, b′)| ≤ 2.
The first holds with equality when d(v, a) = 5, d(v, b) = 1, the second
when one of d(v, a), d(v, a′) is 5 and the other is 3, and the third when one
of d(v, b), d(v, b′) is 3 and the other is 1. We also have
d(v, a) + d(v, b) ≥ 4,
d(v, a) + d(v, a′) ≥ 4,
d(v, b) + d(v, b′) ≥ 2.
The first holds with equality when d(v, a) = 3, d(v, b) = 1 or d(v, a) =
d(v, b) = 2, the second when d(v, a) = d(v, a′) = 2, and the third when d(v, b) =
d(v, b′) = 1. Putting the above inequalities together, we see that d is a valid
q-metric since it satisifies Definition 2.
Also from the above, we have
∑
v∈V d(v, c1) = 5n+4 and
∑
v∈V d(v, c2n+1) =
n+ 4, and so
lim
n→∞
∑
v∈V d(v, c1)∑
v∈V d(v, c2n+1)
= 5.
We will now show that c1 is the Ranked Pairs winner, irrespective of how
ties are broken, in every σ(n).
Recall that w(i, j) = |{v ∈ V : ci v cj}|, the strength of edge ci → cj in
the weighted-tournament graph obtained from σn. We will first show that for
all 1 ≤ i ≤ 2n, w(i, i+ 1) = n+ 1: If 1 ≤ i ≤ n, then w(i, i+ 1) = n+ 1, since
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ci v ci+1 for all v ∈ V except vi. If n + 1 ≤ i ≤ 2n, then w(i, i + 1) = n + 1,
since ci v ci+1 for all v ∈ V except vi−n.
All other edges i→ j fall into the following cases:
• i < j − 1: If j ≤ n + 1, then cj vk ci for all i ≤ k ≤ j − 1. A similar
argument holds when n+ 1 ≤ i. If i ≤ n and j ≥ n+ 2, then cj vk ci at
least for k = i, j − n− 1;
• i > j, then cj v ci at least for v ∈ {v0, v′0}.
In all these cases, cj v ci at least for two agents, and thereby w(i, j) ≤ n.
Therefore, the edges ci → ci+1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2n have the largest weights (with no
ties) and consequently c1 is the Ranked Pairs winner.
The Schulze method [Schulze, 2003] also gives priority to edges of larger
weight, albeit in a more complicated way. The above result holds for the Schulze
rule since it also picks c1 as the winner in the instances constructed.
Corollary 2.
lim
n→∞dist(Schulze, σ
(n)) = 5.
Proof. The proof follows from the fact that the Schulze rule also chooses c1 as
the winner in every instance in the sequence {σ(n)}n≥2, irrespective of how ties
are broken.
Since methods like Ranked Pairs and the Schulze rule [Schulze, 2003] fall in
the category of weighted-tournament rules (C2 functions), we believe that no
weighted-tournament rule can achieve a worst-case distortion of less than 5.
Conjecture 1. Any weighted-tournament rule has a worst-case distortion of at
least 5.
Copeland falls in the category of tournament rules (C1 functions), and
we know that Copeland, and other similar rules related to the uncovered set
[Moulin, 1986], achieve a worst-case distortion of 5 [Anshelevich et al., 2015]. In
fact, a lower bound of 5 for the worst-case distortion of Copeland is established
via an instance where the tournament graph is a 3 node cycle [Anshelevich et al.,
2015]. It therefore follows that the worst-case distortion of any deterministic
tournament rule is at least 5 (since such a rule has no way of distinguishing
between the 3 nodes).
3.2 Randomized tournament/weighted-tournament rules
We will now turn our attention to randomized social choice rules. The worst-case
distortion in this case is at least 2 [Anshelevich and Postl, 2016]. Continuing
our discussion on tournament and weighted-tournament rules, we show that in
the worst-case randomized tournament/weighted-tournament rules do not get
close to the above lower bound. We will construct a sequence of instances where
any randomized tournament or weighted-tournament rule achieves a distortion
of 3 in the limit.
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Theorem 4. Any randomized tournament or weighted-tournament rule has a
worst-case distortion of at least 3.
Proof. Construct an instance σ(m) and a corresponding metric as follows: There
are m + 1 alternatives given by C = {c∗, c1, c2, . . . , cm}. And there are 2m
agents given by V, and V is divided into two groups V = {v1, v2, . . . , vm} and
U = {u1, . . . , um}.
v1 has the preference order c
∗ v1 c1 v1 . . . v1 cm. For 2 ≤ i ≤ m, agent
vi has the preference order c
∗ vi ci vi ci+1 vi . . . vi cm vi c1 vi . . . ci−1.
u1 has the preference order cm u1 . . . u1 c1 u1 c∗. For 2 ≤ i ≤ m, agent
vi has the preference order ci−1 ui . . . c1 ui cm ui . . . ui ci+1 ui ci ui
c∗.
Define a metric d as: ∀v ∈ V , d(v, c∗) = 0 and d(v, c) = 2, ∀c 6= c∗; and
∀u ∈ U , d(u, c) = 1, for all c ∈ C. We omit the details, but this is indeed a valid
metric (see Figure 4 for a graphical illustration).
For any given distribution ~x over the alternatives C, we must have some alter-
native a such that xa ≤ 1m . In this instance, we have w(a, b) = |{v ∈ V ∪U : a v
b}| = m for all a 6= b ∈ C, i.e., w(a,b)|V| = 0.5. Since the tournament/weighted-
tournament graph is completely symmetric (since the edge weight is equal to
0.5 on all directed edges), we can assume without loss of generality that c∗ = a
3.
The expected cost for c∗ is
∑
v∈V
d(v, c∗) +
∑
u∈U
d(u, c∗) = m(0) +m(1) = m,
The expected cost for the distribution ~x is
∑
c∈C
xc
∑
v∈V
d(v, c) +
∑
c∈C
xc
∑
u∈U
d(u, c) = xc∗
∑
t∈V ∪U
d(t, c∗) +
∑
c6=c∗
xc
∑
t∈V ∪U
d(t, c)
Since d(v, c∗) = 0 for all v ∈ V , and d(u, c∗) = 1 for all u ∈ U , we get∑
t∈V ∪U d(t, c
∗) = m. For any c 6= c∗, t ∈ V ∪ U , we defined d(t, c) = 3,
which implies that
∑
t∈V ∪U d(t, c) = 3m.
Using the above, the expected cost becomes
xc∗(m) +
∑
c6=c∗
xc(3m) = xc∗(m) + (1− xc∗)(3m) = 3m− xc∗(2m)
≥ 3m− 1
m
(2m) = 3m− 2.
Therefore, the distortion ratio is at least (3m−2)/m = 3−2/m which tends
to 3 as m→∞ .
3Tournament/weighted-tournament rules are inherently anonymous, but the winner in this
case will depend on hows ties are broken. We can get around this issue by tailoring the
constructed instance appropriately, i.e., swapping the roles of c∗ and the chosen winner.
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m agents U
m agents
V
1
Figure 4: Underlying metric in proof of Theorem 4
Putting Theorems 3 and 4 together, we see that Copeland does at least as
well as Ranked Pairs, and randomized tournament/weighted-tournament rules
perform no better than Randomized Dictatorship with respect to the worst-case
distortion of the sum of costs objective. In the next section, we will show that
the upper bounds on the distortion of the sum of costs, for both Copeland and
Randomized Dictatorship, hold much more generally.
3.3 Instance Optimal Distortion
For any given instance, the single alternative that achieves the least worst-case
distortion over all consistent metrics can be found in polynomial time (by solving
a polynomial number of linear programs). This follows in a straighforward
fashion from the fact that the metric inequalities are linear. The same is true also
in the randomized case, perhaps not so directly, in that we can find the optimal
distribution over alternatives in polynomial time. The technical details of this
claim are provided in Section 6.1 in the appendix. Given the computability of
these instance optimal functions, we believe that:
Conjecture 2. There exists a deterministic social choice rule that achieves a
worst-case distortion of at most 3, and a randomized rule that achieves a worst-
case distortion of at most 2.
4 Fairness in distortion
As mentioned before, we introduce a way of quantifying the fairness of social
choice rules by using the concept of approximate majorization within the met-
ric distortion framework. One could hope to adapt other notions of fairness
like envy-freeness [Lipton et al., 2004] and leximin [Rawls, 2009, Barbara` and
Jackson, 1988] (actually leximax since we are dealing with costs) into the dis-
tortion framework. While the standard definition of envy-freeness applies to
problems involving the division of goods, and requires no inter-personal com-
parison of utilities, we could perhaps re-purpose it to our setting by looking at
the difference between the largest and smallest costs for any given alternative.
This quantity in itself cannot be bounded because it is not scale-invariant – for
whenever it is positive, the metric can be scaled to make the envy unbounded.
Unfortunately, using this “envy” as the objective in the distortion ratio is also
fruitless (see Example 2 below).
We know that Copeland achieves a worst-case distortion of 5 for objectives
given by α-percentiles for α ∈ [0.5, 1) [Anshelevich et al., 2015]. Here the α-
percentile cost with respect to any alternative c ∈ C corresponds to the smallest
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value x ∈ {d(v, c)| v ∈ V} for which #{v∈V| d(v,c)≤x}N > α. It is easy to see that
such an upper bound for all α ∈ [0, 1) would subsume our results. However, for
α ∈ [0, 0.5), any deterministic rule has unbounded distortion in the worst case.
To see this, consider the following example.
Example 2. Consider two alternatives c1, c2. There are two sets of agents U
and V of size N/2 each which have preference c1  c2 and c2  c1 respectively.
Assume without loss of generality that c1 is picked as the winner by the given
social choice rule.
Let d(v, c1) = 1 ≤ d(v, c2) = 1 for all v ∈ V , and d(u, c2) =  < d(u, c1) = 1
for all u ∈ U . By invoking Lemma 1, we can see that this gives us a consistent
metric.
For α ∈ [0, 0.5), we have that the α-percentile costs for c1 and c2 are 1 and
 respectively. The distortion ratio is then 1 , which goes to ∞ as → 0.
Now assume c2 is picked as the winner. The maximum envy in this case is
1 − . And in the case of c1 the maximum envy is 0, leading to an unbounded
ratio.
The above example also shows us why a leximax comparison does not work.
Ordering the costs for c1 and c2 in non-decreasing order, let us compare the
costs at the first position at which these orders differ. At the (N/2 + 1)-th
position, the cost for c1 is 1, and that for c2 is , leading to an unbounded ratio
as → 0.
4.1 Bounding the fairness ratio of Copeland rule
In this section, we show that Copeland achieves a fairness ratio of at most
5. Besides Copeland, other weighted-tournament rules such as those selecting
winners from the minimal covering set, the bipartisan set, banks set, or any
other subset of the uncovered set, also achieve a fairness-ratio of at most 5.
Theorem 5. For any instance σ, if x is the Copeland winner, and z is any
other alternative, then
fairness(Copeland, σ) = sup
d∈ρ(σ)
max
1≤k≤N
maxS⊆V:|S|=k
∑
v∈S d(v, x)
maxS⊆V:|S|=k
∑
v∈S d(v, z)
≤ 5.
Proof. Fix any k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}.
For any a, b ∈ C, denote the set of agents that prefer a over b by Gab = {v ∈
V : a v b}.
And for any t ∈ C, let
St , arg max
S⊆V:|S|=k
∑
v∈S
d(v, t).
Since x is the Copeland winner, we know, from the connection to the un-
covered set [Moulin, 1986], that either (A) |Gxz| ≥ N2 , or (B) ∃y ∈ C, such that
|Gxy| ≥ N2 and |Gyz| ≥ N2 . We deal with each case separately.
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Case (A): Let g : V → V be any one-one map such that if v ∈ Sx \Gxz then
g(v) ∈ Gxz. One such map exists because |Sx \Gxz| ≤ |V \Gxz| ≤ N2 ≤ |Gxz|.
Let A = Sx ∩Gxz and B = Sx \Gxz.
∑
v∈Sx
d(v, x) =
∑
v∈A
d(v, x) +
∑
v∈B
d(v, x)
≤
∑
v∈A
d(v, z) +
∑
v∈B
d(v, x)
≤
∑
v∈A
d(v, z) +
∑
v∈B
(d(g(v), x) + d(g(v), z) + d(v, z))
=
∑
v∈Sx
d(v, z) +
∑
v∈B
(d(g(v), x) + d(g(v), z))
≤
∑
v∈Sx
d(v, z) +
∑
v∈B
2d(g(v), z)
≤ 3
∑
v∈Sz
d(v, z).
In the above sequence, the first inequality follow from the fact that v ∈ A =⇒
v ∈ Gxz and for any v ∈ Gxz, d(v, x) ≤ d(v, z) by definition. The second
inequality follows after invoking Condition 2 from Definition 2. The third in-
equality is true because g(v) ∈ Gxz by definition, and the fourth because for
any S ⊆ V such that |S| ≤ k, ∑v∈S d(v, z) ≤∑v∈Sz d(v, z) by the definition of
Sz.
Case (B): Let h : V → V be any one-one map such that if v ∈ Sx \Gxy then
h(v) ∈ Gxy. One such map exists because |Sx \Gxy| ≤ |V \Gxy| ≤ N2 ≤ |Gxy|.
Let P = Sx ∩Gxy and Q = Sx \Gxy
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∑
v∈Sx
d(v, x) =
∑
v∈P
d(v, x) +
∑
v∈Q
d(v, x)
≤
∑
v∈P
d(v, y) +
∑
v∈Q
d(v, x)
≤
∑
v∈P
(d(h(v), y) + d(h(v), z) + d(v, z))
+
∑
v∈Q
(d(h(v), x) + d(h(v), z) + d(v, z))
=
∑
v∈P
d(h(v), y) +
∑
v∈Q
d(h(v), x) +
∑
v∈Sx
d(v, z) +
∑
v∈Sx
d(h(v), z)
≤
∑
v∈P
d(h(v), y) +
∑
v∈Q
d(h(v), y) +
∑
v∈Sx
d(v, z) +
∑
v∈Sx
d(h(v), z)
=
∑
v∈Sx
d(h(v), y) +
∑
v∈Sx
d(v, z) +
∑
v∈Sx
d(h(v), z)
≤
∑
v∈Sy
d(v, y) + 2
∑
v∈Sz
d(v, z) ≤ 5
∑
v∈Sz
d(v, z)
In the above sequence, the first inequality follow from the fact that v ∈ P =⇒
v ∈ Gxy and for any v ∈ Gxy, d(v, x) ≤ d(v, y) by definition. The second
inequality follows after invoking Condition 2 from Defintion 2. The third in-
equality is true because h(v) ∈ Gxy by definition, and the fourth because for any
t ∈ C and S ⊆ V such that |S| ≤ k, ∑v∈S d(v, t) ≤∑v∈St d(v, t) by the defini-
tion of St. The last follows from the fact that
∑
v∈Sy d(v, y) ≤ 3
∑
v∈Sz d(v, z)
by case (a) above.
The fact that the inequality in Theorem 5 above is tight follows from the
known example [Anshelevich et al., 2015] in which Copeland achieves a distor-
tion of 5 with respect to the sum of costs objective.
As mentioned before Copeland also does well with respect to other objectives
such as median and α-percentiles for α ∈ [0.5, 1) [Anshelevich and Postl, 2016].
These functions are not convex and hence do not fall under the category of
functions that can be approximated with the help of the fairness ratio. An
interesting question is to characterize the entire class of functions for which
Copeland achieves a constant factor bound on the distortion.
4.2 Randomized Dictatorship
For randomized rules, the connection of the fairness-ratio to convex cost func-
tions does not hold in terms of the expectation variants of the quantities in-
volved. However, the fairness ratio in its own right is a generalization of both
max-min fairness and total cost minimization, and is hence worth studying in
the case of randomized social choice rules.
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Our last result is that Randomized Dictatorship, which achieves a worst-case
distortion of 3, also achieves a fairness ratio of 3 in expectation.
Theorem 6. For any instance σ, alternative y, and X chosen according to
Randomized Dictatorship
sup
d∈ρ(σ)
max
1≤k≤N
E[maxS⊆V:|S|=k
∑
v∈S d(v,X)]
maxS⊆V:|S|=k
∑
v∈S d(v, y)
≤ 3.
Proof. Fix any k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, and any alternative y ∈ C.
For all c ∈ C, denote the set of agents with c as their top choice by Vc =
{v ∈ V : c v c′, ∀c′ 6= c}, and the size of this set as Nc = |Vc|. Let the total
number of agents be given by N = |V|.
For any alternative c ∈ C, denote the set of agents that maximize the sum
of k costs for it by Sc = arg maxS⊆V:|S|=k
∑
v∈S d(v, c).
For all c ∈ C, by the triangle inequality we have∑
v∈Sc
d(v, c) ≤
∑
v∈Sc
(d(v, y) + d(c, y))
≤ k · d(c, y) +
∑
v∈Sy
d(v, y), (4)
where the second inequality follows by the definition of Sy.
For any c ∈ C, if v ∈ Vc, we have d(v, c) ≤ d(v, y) (by the definition of Vc),
and d(v, c) + d(v, y) ≥ d(c, y) (by the triangle inequality), which together imply
d(v, y) ≥ d(c,y)2 . Therefore,
∑
v∈V
d(v, y) =
∑
c∈C
∑
v∈Vc
d(v, y) ≥
∑
c∈C
Nc
d(c, y)
2
. (5)
Consequently, we get
∑
v∈Sy
d(v, y) ≥ k
N
∑
v∈V
d(v, y) ≥ k
N
∑
c∈C
Nc
d(c, y)
2
, (6)
where the first inequality follows by the definition of Sy, and the second from
the inequality in 5. We can now bound the expected distortion as follows:
E[maxS⊆V:|S|=k
∑
v∈S d(v,X)]
maxS⊆V:|S|=k
∑
v∈S d(v, y)
=
∑
c∈C
Nc
N
∑
v∈Sc d(v, c)∑
v∈Sy d(v, y)
≤
∑
c∈C
Nc
N (k · d(c, y) +
∑
v∈Sy d(v, y))∑
v∈Sy d(v, y)
≤ 1 +
∑
c∈C
Nc
N k · d(c, y)∑
v∈Sy d(v, y)
≤ 1 +
k
N
∑
c∈C Nc · d(c, y)
k
N
∑
c∈C Nc
d(c,y)
2
≤ 3
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We have made use of 4 and 6 to get the first and third inequalities in the
above sequence.
To make amply clear that the bound on the fairness ratio of randomized
does not extend to convex functions, we will now look at an example where the
distortion of randomized dictatorship is unbounded when the objective used is
the square of the sum of costs.
Example 3. Consider two agents {c1, c2} and N1 +N2 agents in total divided
into two groups V1 and V2. Assume all of the above are points in R. c1 = 0 and
c2 = 1. Every agent in V1 is at 0, and every agent in V2 is at 1. Also assume
that N1 ≥ N2.
Let C(~x) = (
∑
i xi)
2
. With C as the cost objective, the optimal alternative
is c1. The social cost of this alternative is equal to N
2
2 .
Randomized dictatorship chooses c1 with probability
N1
N1+N2
and c2 with prob-
ability N2N1+N2 . The expected cost is equal to
N22
N1
N1 +N2
+N21
N2
N1 +N2
= N1N2.
The distortion ratio is N1N2/N
2
2 = N1/N2 which is unbounded in the limit
N1 →∞ for any fixed N2.
The fact that the distortion of Randomized Dictatorship with respect to
convex cost objectives is unbounded makes the fairness properties of Copeland
even more interesting. It seems surprising that a simple rule like Copeland can
approximate the optimal alternative over a very general class of cost functions.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we further the understanding of the performance of social choice
rules under metric preferences with respect to the distortion measure. We
provide lower bounds on worst-case distortion for deterministic rules such as
Ranked Pairs and Schulze, and randomized tournament/weighted-tournament
rules. We introduce a framework to study the fairness properties of social choice
rules within the distortion framework, and provide low constant-factor upper
bounds on the fairness ratios of some well known mechanisms like Copeland
and Randomized Dictatorship. In particular, what stands out is that Copeland
not only achieves the best known upper bound for deterministic rules, but also
simultaneously approximates a large class of cost functions.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Instance-optimal Distortion
For any instance σ, imagine c is the alternative chosen as the outcome of a social
choice rule, and c′ is the candidate with minimum sum cost with respect to the
metric that maximizes distortion. It then follows, very directly from the work
of [Anshelevich et al., 2015], that the value of the distortion can be found using
the following Linear program:
Linear Program 1.
A(c, c′, σ) , max
∑
v∈V
d(c, v)
subject to
∑
v∈V
d(c′, v) = 1
d ∈ ρ(σ)
This is a linear program because d ∈ ρ(σ) if and only if d satisfies the
inequalities in Definition 2, and is consistent with σ. Consistency can also be
captured by linear inequalities as mentioned earlier.
We can then define an instance-optimal deterministic choice function OPTdet
which chooses the alternative that minimizes the maximum distortion as
OPTdet(σ) = arg min
c∈C
max
c′∈C
A(c, c′, σ)
The map OPTdet can be computed in polynomial time, since it involves
solving a linear program per pair of candidates. We conjecture that this method
always achieves a distortion of not more than 3. We believe that this is an
interesting combinatorial problem that is worth looking at.
Conjecture 3. OPTdet achieves a distortion of not more than 3.
We can define a similar randomized rule OPTrand that finds the instance-
optimal alternative. Surprisingly, this can also be computed in polynomial time,
and in what follows we show how.
If, for an instance σ, a distribution {xc}c∈C (
∑
c∈C xc = 1) over C is chosen
as the social outcome, and an alternative c′ maximizes distortion, its value can
be found by solving the following Linear Program:
Linear Program 2.
A(~x, c′, σ) , max
∑
c∈C
xc
∑
v∈V
d(c, v)
subject to
∑
v∈V
d(c′, v) = 1
d ∈ ρ(σ).
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Let ∆(C) be the set of all distributions over C. Then we can define OPTrand
to choose the alternative corresponding to the minimax solution as follows:
OPTrand(σ) = arg min
~x∈∆(C)
max
c′∈C
A(~x, c′) (7)
We will impose additional constraints on the metrics we consider. We say
that a metric d is normal if and only if minc′∈C
∑
v∈V d(c
′, v) = 1. We will
denote by θ(σ) the set of all normal metrics that are consistent with the instance
σ.
This minimax problem above can be cast into a minimization problem in
the following way:
Problem 1 (Minimax problem).
minimize γ
subject to
∑
c∈C
xc = 1∑
c∈C
xc
∑
v∈V
d(c, v) ≤ γ ∀d ∈ θ(σ)
We can use binary search to do a polynomial time reduction of the above
to checking feasibility over γ. We know that 3 is an upper bound from the fact
that Randomized Dictatorship achieves a worst-case distortion of 3.
Problem 2 (Feasibility). Given an instance σ and a γ ∈ [1, 3], is it feasible for
the Minimax Problem (Problem 1)? If so, find ~x such that
∑
c∈C xc = 1 and∑
c∈C xc
∑
v∈V d(c, v) ≤ γ, ∀d ∈ θ(σ).
Given γ ∈ [1, 3], denote by Fγ the convex feasible region of ~x determined by
the following inequalities:
(a) ~x ∈ ∆(C),
(b) ∀d ∈ θ(σ), ∑c∈C xc∑v∈V d(c, v) ≤ γ.
Note that the set of inequalities given by (b) is uncountable.
To solve Problem 2, we can make use of the following separation oracle.
Problem 3 (Separation Oracle). Given γ and ~x, either claim that x ∈ Fγ , or
find a d ∈ θ(σ) such that ∑c∈C xc∑v∈V d(c, v) > γ.
Definition 3 (c′-normal). A metric d is called c′-normal if and only if
(i) minc′∈C
∑
v∈V d(c
′, v) = 1, and,
(ii) minc 6=c′ d(c′, v) ≥ 1.
A normal metric d has to be c′-normal for some c′. To solve Problem 3, we
make use of the following two observations:
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• For a given ~x, it belongs to F if ∀c′ ∈ C, ∑c∈C xc∑v∈V d(c, v) ≤ γ for all
consistent, c′-normal metrics.
• And if ∑c∈C xc∑v∈V d(c, v) > γ for all consistent, normal metrics d, then
it must be so for some consistent c′-normal metric.
As a result, the separation oracle problem can be solved by solving the
following Linear Program 3 for all c′ ∈ C, for the ~x given to the oracle.
Linear Program 3.
A(~x, c′) , max
∑
c∈C
xc
∑
v∈V
d(c, v)
subject to
∑
v∈V
d(c′, v) = 1
d is a consistent, c′-normal metric.
Theorem 7. The Minimax Problem (Problem 1) can be solved by solving a
polynomial number of linear programs of type 3.
This leads us to another interesting direction for future research – analyzing
this polynomial time LP-based algorithm could give us a worst-case distortion
of 2.
Conjecture 4. OPTrand achieves a distortion of not more than 2.
6.2 Distortion of Randomized social choice rules: Metric
response vs. Candidate response
6.2.1 Metric Response
The notion of distortion we defined for randomized functions can be described
in terms of the following game:
We have a sequential game, where the social choice function, denoted by
the player ALG, plays first choosing a distribution {xc}c∈C over all candidates,
followed by an adversarial player ADV who chooses a metric d, and automati-
cally the best possible choice of c′ for that metric. The payoffs are given by a
zero sum game where the utility of ADV is exactly the value of the distortion
achieved. The corresponding minimax solution is then given by Equation 7.
We call the above the metric response game, and the value of this game as
the distortion under metric response.
6.2.2 Candidate Response
We could think of variants of the above game where the adversary is more
powerful. For example, consider the following:
ALG plays first choosing a distribution {xc}c∈C over all candidates. ADV
then follows by choosing a single candidate c′.
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Let’s say that σ is the instance at hand. For each draw c from the distribution
chosen by ALG, and given c′, nature picks a metric so that the utility of ADV
is A(c, c′, σ), and that of ALG is −A(c, c′, σ).
The corresponding minimax solution is then given by
min
~x∈∆(C)
max
c′∈C
A(c, c′, σ) (8)
We call the above the candidate response game, and the value of this game
as the distortion under candidate response.
Since the adversary under candidate response is stronger than that under
metric response, the lower bounds for distortion under metric response carry
over to the candidate response. For example:
Theorem 8. No randomized tournament rule can achieve a distortion ratio of
less than 3 for all problem instances.
Proof. Follows from Theorem 4.
However, these lower bounds need not be tight. Characterizing tighter lower
bounds here is an open question.
Another interesting open problem under candidate response is characterizing
achievable tight upper bounds on distortion. For example, does Randomized
Dictatorship always achieve a distortion of at most 3 in this case?
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